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Non-technical summary
In this paper, we present a new approach to disclose the impact of policy preferences
of parties on economic growth. We derive policy preferences of parties, such as political
ideology and preferences restricted to single policy dimensions, from the content analysis
of party manifestos. This data is obtained from the Comparative Manifesto Project
(CMP), an international large scale project in political science that has collected the
wording of thousands of election manifestos. These are coded according to the frequency of
sentences devoted to 56 different policy issues, which comprise economic and non-economic
issues and are regarded as proxies for the party preferences in the related political science
literature. Based on this data, it is possible to calculate indices for the general left-right
position as well as concerning specific policy areas that represent the political preferences
of the parties or legislatures.
In the empirical section, we analyse per capita GDP growth in a panel of 23 OECD
countries for the period 1971-2004. We estimate several models containing a set of typical
control variables; fixed effects control for time-invariant country-specific influences. First,
we follow an approach which is typical for the empirical political economics literature and
employ dummy variables for the differentiation of left-wing and right-wing governments.
However, we are not able to detect a significant impact of partisanship on growth rates.
This implies that partisanship defined according to the broad distinction between left-
wing and right-wing governments cannot be proven to affect economic growth.
Then we proceed with analyses based on 7 indices that account for the political preferences
concerning different policy areas. These indicators are first tested individually in our
empirical model, and then jointly in a model averaging procedure, the weighted averaged
least squares (WALS) method. A strong and robust negative impact on economic growth
can be detected for parties that support market interventions, whereas a positive impact
can be found for parties that aim at setting incentives for business as well as those which
promote technology and infrastructure. Welfare state policies are also found to have a
significant negative effect in our classical estimations, but show a much weaker impact
in our WALS analysis. These results are robust to several changes in specification. The
consideration of programmatic profiles of parties thus allows us to identify a growth effect
for certain policy areas. This underlines the importance of choosing the correct ideology
measure for the analysis of partisan effects on economic outcomes.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
In diesem Papier wird ein neuartiger Ansatz zur Untersuchung des Einflusses von politi-
schen Pra¨ferenzen auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung vorgestellt. Wir leiten diese Poli-
tikpra¨ferenzen, welche die ideologische Ausrichtung wie auch einzelne politische Dimen-
sionen umfassen, aus der Inhaltsanalyse von Parteiprogrammen ab. Es werden Daten
vom Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) herangezogen, welches ein großangelegtes
politikwissenschaftliches Projekt darstellt, das die Texte von tausenden Wahlprogram-
men gesammelt hat. Diese sind entsprechend der Ha¨ufigkeit der Nennung von Sa¨tzen in
Bezug auf 56 verschiedene Politikbereiche erfasst, die sowohl o¨konomische als auch nicht-
o¨konomische Themen umfassen und in der verwandten politikwissenschaftlichen Literatur
als Proxys fu¨r die Parteipra¨ferenzen angesehen werden. Basierend auf diesen Daten ist es
mo¨glich, Indices fu¨r die allgemeine Links-rechts-Position wie auch fu¨r bestimmte Politik-
bereiche zu berechnen, welche die politischen Pra¨ferenzen der Parteien bzw. des Gesetz-
gebers darstellen.
Im empirischen Teil wird das Wachstum des Pro-Kopf-BIP in einem Panel von 23 OECD-
La¨ndern fu¨r den Zeitraum 1971-2004 untersucht. Es wird eine Reihe von Modellen
gescha¨tzt, welche die typischen Kontrollvariablen enthalten; zudem kontrollieren fixe Ef-
fekte fu¨r zeitinvariante la¨nderspezifische Einflu¨sse. Am Anfang folgen wir dem in der
polito¨konomischen Literatur u¨blichen Ansatz und verwenden Dummyvariablen fu¨r die
Differenzierung von linken und rechten Regierungen. Jedoch la¨sst sich auf dieser Basis
kein signifikanter Einfluss der Ideologievariable nachweisen. Demnach u¨bt politische Ide-
ologie, sofern diese lediglich an Hand der groben Unterscheidung von linken und rechten
Regierungen definiert wird, keinen nachweisbaren Effekt auf die Wachstumsraten aus.
Anschließend werden Untersuchungen auf der Basis von sieben Indices durchgefu¨hrt,
welche die politischen Pra¨ferenzen in Bezug auf spezifische Politikfelder erfassen. Diese In-
dikatoren werden erst individuell in unserem empirischen Modell getestet, danach zusam-
men in einem “Model Averaging” Ansatz, der “Weighted Averaged Least Squares” (WALS)
Methode. Ein starker und robuster negativer Effekt kann fu¨r solche Parteien nachgewiesen
werden, die positiv gegenu¨ber Eingriffen in das Marktgeschehen eingestellt sind, wohinge-
gen ein positiver Einfluss fu¨r Parteien gefunden werden kann, die Anreize fu¨r Unternehmen
anstreben oder Technologie und Infrastruktur propagieren. Auch fu¨r wohlfahrtsstaatliche
Politiken wird in den klassischen Scha¨tzungen ein signifikanter negativer Effekt gefunden,
diese zeigen aber in der WALS-Analyse einen deutlich geringeren Einfluss. Diese Ergeb-
nisse sind robust gegenu¨ber einer Vielzahl weiterer A¨nderungen der Spezifikation. Die
Beru¨cksichtigung der programmatischen Profile von Parteien la¨sst uns demnach einen
Wachstumseffekt fu¨r verschiedene Politikbereiche identifizieren. Dieser Befund unter-
streicht die Bedeutung der Wahl des richtigen Ideologiemaßes bei der Untersuchung des
Effekts politischer Ideologie auf o¨konomische Auswirkungen.
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1 Introduction
The political environment of a democratic country can impact on the performance of
the national economy in many ways. Some of these determinants of economic growth,
such as the public expenditure level and structure, are easily measurable, so that their
impacts on growth rates are examinable in econometric analyses without difficulty. Other
channels are almost impossible to quantify, especially if their impact on economic growth
is indirect, e.g. via the expectations of the market participants. In this regard, recent
research provides evidence that the partisanship of the government by itself matters for
the expectations of financial markets (see Snowberg et al. (2007)) and affects private
consumption (Gerber and Huber (2009)). Consequently, when it comes to the overall
impact of the political environment, which encompasses aspects such as the composition
of the legislature and the political preferences of the parties represented in it, addressing
the issue based only on one or a few observable policy indicators is impossible.
The impact of parties’ policy preferences on growth is the focus of this paper. These
preferences can have different meanings: in a broader sense, policy preferences are syn-
onymous with political ideology; and in a more narrow sense, preferences are restricted
to single policy dimensions. For instance, parties can be characterized according to di-
mensions such as market-liberal or interventionist, or regarding their preferences towards
single policy issues such as welfare state policies. In this paper, we employ an innovative
approach to quantify such policy preferences of parties. These are derived from the con-
tent analysis of party manifestos and it will be demonstrated in various growth regressions
that the policy preferences of the legislature impact on the economic performance of the
OECD countries.
The starting point of our analysis is political partisanship, which can be regarded as the
most prominent proxy for political preferences. According to the partisan politics lit-
erature, politicians are not only office-motivated as implied by the Downsian model of
elections, but are also interested in the political outcome.1 Consequently, politicians from
different political wings – usually distinguished in left and right – differ in their political
actions and in the expectations their incumbency generates among citizens. Concerning
growth-relevant economic policies, partisanship can then be interpreted as the proxy for
a set of preferred policies typically ascribed to the ideological wings: whereas left-wing
1Formal foundations of this literature and the conditions under which these distinctive preferences are
actually reflected in policy outcomes can be found in Wittman (1977) and Calvert (1985).
1
parties worry more about redistribution and are more inclined to intervene in markets,
their right-wing counterparts tend to be more supportive of free markets and inclined to
provide positive incentives to business. Based on endogenous growth theory, one may
make the very simplified assumption that these left-wing policies should tend to dampen
growth since they distort the capital accumulation decision of the private sector; the right-
wing policies should tend to have the opposite effect.
The surprising insight provided by the literature, however, is that the partisan effect on
economic performance – despite its intuitive relevance – has found almost no empirical
testing until now, and in particular, no robust evidence exists. This issue will be con-
fronted by our empirical approach. Our main innovation is the introduction of a new data
source for political preferences which is derived from the quantitative analysis of party
manifestos. Thus, we are able to calculate party positions not only with respect to the
general left-right dimension, but also with respect to single policy dimensions.
Our approach has decisive advantages over the approaches typically taken in the partisan
politics literature: we do not have to assume that a certain group of parties (i.e., left-
wing or right-wing) stands for a certain set of policies, but we are able to identify the
preferences of the parties concerning the particular policy areas and their changes over
time. By this means, we are not only able to detect whether the overall partisanship of
the legislature impacts on growth, but we are also able to identify the impact of party
preferences for single policy dimensions, such as support for the welfare state or incentives
for business. In this regard, our paper complements the existing literature which studies
the effect of certain policy areas on economic growth based on measurable policies, such
as public expenditure figures.
Our panel analysis of OECD countries since 1970 confirms that partisanship, defined only
based on the party label of the government as being left-wing or right-wing, does not af-
fect growth. Discrepancies defined as programmatic differences, however, actually affect
the economic performance; and our approach allows us to identify the growth-enhancing
and growth-reducing policies. A strong and robust negative impact can be detected for
policies related to market interventions, whereas a positive impact can be found for poli-
cies which aim at setting incentives for business and policies promoting technology and
infrastructure. These effects are shown to be robust in a number of different empirical
specifications, as well as in a model averaging approach which accounts for model uncer-
tainty, a problem inherent in growth regressions.
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview over the related theory
and empirical findings concerning the effect of political factors on growth. Section 3 in-
troduces our measure for political preferences. In section 4, the empirical approaches are
introduced and our results are presented. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature overview
2.1 Channels of the impact of politics on growth
The theoretical and the empirical growth literature constitute a natural starting point for
the analysis of the impact of politics on economic performance. This strand of literature
mainly focusses on determinants such as redistribution, institutional quality, public in-
vestments in infrastructure and microeconomic incentives.2 These approaches are based
on endogenous growth theory3, where private capital accumulation is the relevant factor
for economic growth. In this sense, any political interference in the markets which biases
private incentives for capital accumulation necessarily impacts on growth. In this class of
models, the growth effect of redistribution is straightforward: it reduces the incentives to
accumulate capital through the tax distortions imposed on capital owners.4 Similarly, a
low quality of institutions, such as a lack of property rights, reduces incentives to invest.
On the other hand, governments setting positive microeconomic incentives for the pri-
vate sector (such as deregulation or encouragement to start enterprises) should generate a
positive impact on economic growth. Other policy areas which are discussed more contro-
versially in the theoretical literature are public investments5 and fiscal decentralization6.
In the related empirical literature, the straightforward approach to analyse the growth ef-
fects of single policy areas is the use of budgetary measures as explanatory variables, such
as the size of the public sector, expenditures for different policy areas or the structure of
taxation. Concerning the overall budget size, studies generally tend to find a negative im-
pact, which gives support to the expectation that a large public sector generally impacts
2Further aspects, such as political stability or democracy, are neglected, since they play a minor role
for industrialized countries.
3See Barro (1990) for the benchmark model and Baier and Glomm (2001) for an extension focussing
on the effects of fiscal policy.
4Note that the relationship of redistribution and growth is much more complex in other models which
are more relevant for developing countries, such as those considering capital market imperfections. These
might even imply a positive effect. See Drazen (2000) for an overview over the competing approaches.
5See Irmen and Kuehnel (2009).
6See the survey in Baskaran and Feld (2009).
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negatively on growth. This finding is, however, not undisputed if one restricts to highly
developed countries. It then largely depends on the empirical specification (see Bergh
and Karlsson (2010)).7 A further important insight from the related literature is that in
industrialized countries the expenditure and revenues structure are important determi-
nants. Kneller et al. (1999) and more recently Angelopoulos et al. (2007) divide public
expenditures into productive and unproductive ones and show that the former category
has a positive effect on economic growth. Similarly, they show that distortionary taxation
has a negative effect.
The expenditure category which has received most attention in the empirical literature
is social expenditures and encompasses policies related to the size of the welfare state.
Early research by Persson and Tabellini (1994) detects the expected negative effect of
redistribution on growth, while further research surveyed by Drazen (2000) does not find
much support for this channel. The general problem of this approach, however, is that
pro-welfare state policies can take many other forms than social expenditures, such as
tax policy, minimum wages or other regulations (Drazen (2000): 517). To overcome this
problem, several studies use income inequality as a proxy for potential redistribution, but
this literature does not obtain clear results (see, e.g., Banerjee and Duflo (2003)). Con-
cerning public investment, Romp and de Haan (2007) review the empirical literature and
conclude that most studies find a positive effect on growth.
Regulation of markets is even more difficult to measure with a catch-all indicator than
to measure budgetary variables. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) construct a set of indica-
tors and detect a negative relation of product market regulation and growth. A further
measurable political outcome is the degree of fiscal decentralization. In this regard, empir-
ical results are inconsistent: Thornton (2007) finds a positive impact of decentralization,
whereas Baskaran and Feld (2009), who apply more sophisticated data on decentraliza-
tion, do not find a significant impact.
Whereas most of the cited works focus on rather medium to long-term effects of public
policy on growth, the literature studying the speed of the effects and short-term effects
is very limited. Nevertheless, most recent evidence by Romer and Romer (2010) suggests
that shifts in public policy can affect economic growth rates quite fast. They find that
a significant negative effect of tax increases on GDP growth in the USA can already be
7Moreover, such studies are exposed to severe methodological problems, as emphasized by Agell et
al. (2006). They control for simultaneity and do not find a significant impact of public sector size in
industrialized countries.
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detected after three quarters. Short-term studies with a more detailed perspective on
fiscal policy, such as spending categories or the tax structure, are not available.
2.2 Expectation-related effects of politics
The short survey above was intended to demonstrate that there is a wide range of policies
which can be expected to have a direct impact on growth; but these are difficult to study
empirically since easily available indicators, such as expenditure categories, are not suffi-
cient to give an overall picture of public activity. Even worse, the impact of the political
environment on the economic performance might work via the expectations of the market
participants. A change of the political environment, such as a change of government or
an ideological shift of the legislature after an election, might have an immediate effect on
these expectations, even before any new regulations or laws are made or have come into
force. The resulting impact can then not be captured by the empirical approaches pre-
sented in the preceding subsection as they all focus on political actions which are actually
conducted.
The existence of such an indirect impact of the political environment is probably most
apparent for business expectations. Entrepreneurs who take investment or production
decisions for the medium or long-term base them on expectations of the profitability,
which depend on the general conditions not only in the present, but also in the future.
Consequently, expectations concerning the future political actions play an important role.
Empirically, Snowberg et al. (2007) show that the uncertainty in the aftermath of the U.S.
presidential election 2004 impacted on several prediction markets. In particular, the rising
expectation of a Republican victory had a positive effect on stock markets and interest
rate expectations. Füss and Bechtel (2007) show that an increasing winning probability
of right-wing parties in the German elections of 2002 had a positive effect on the stock
market performance of small firms, while the winning probabilities of the left-wing had
the adverse effect. Such an immediate effect of the political environment on the stock
market reflects altered earning expectations. It can be assumed that changes of these
expectations influence the real economy in the short term via a change in investments or
the production level, albeit definite empirical evidence is missing.
Moreover, recent research in political science also detects a similar channel at the con-
sumer’s level. Based on US survey data, Gerber and Huber (2010) show empirically that
consumer sentiment at the individual level is biased by the combination of the consumer’s
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ideological position and the party in power. Since consumer sentiment is a main determi-
nant of actual consumption behaviour, the immediate relevance of consumer sentiment for
the real economy is straightforward. Such an effect is documented by Gerber and Huber
(2009) for county-level sales data. Consequently, it is also imaginable that the political
environment affects private consumption via consumer sentiment.
2.3 Overall effect of the political environment
The political-economic literature has always been very interested in studying whether
and how the political environment in democratic societies at a particular time affects
their economic performance. This is usually analysed in empirical growth models bor-
rowed from macroeconometric approaches. Yet, the isolated testing of the single channels
which were discussed in subsection 2.1 is not sufficient to get an overall impression of the
impact of the political environment since political actions are not entirely quantifiable
and expectation-related effects are completely neglected in these approaches.
A different approach is to focus on the political preferences of the decision maker (i.e.
the legislature or government) which determine his actions, but they are difficult to break
down to a catch-all indicator. A voluminous literature studies the impact of economic
freedom indices and usually confirms a positive impact of market-liberal environments
on growth rates (see the meta-analysis by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) for an
overview of the findings). This literature, however, leaves many questions unanswered
since the application of economic freedom indices is hardly able to differentiate between
different policy areas. Consequently, by this means it is difficult to identify the growth-
driving policies, especially when it comes to the impact of the political decision-making as
several of the components of these indices are not in the responsibility of political decision-
makers, such as monetary policy, or have an institutional or path-dependent background
which is not subject to rapid changes, such as the legal system. Moreover, a number of
methodological objections are raised against this indicator and the related research, which
is discussed in detail by de Haan et al. (2006).
In this paper, we focus on the partisan politics approach to public policy. According to
the partisan politics literature (see Mueller (2003) for a survey), parties differ in their
political preferences and, consequently, their actions. The ideological orientation is then
regarded as a proxy for a set of policies which is typically related to the political wing
of the party, and usually differentiates parties in left-wing and right-wing. In political
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science, this broad categorization of party positions is known as the party family ap-
proach. Some recent works demonstrate that political ideologies defined according to
the party family affiliation of the government are a major determinant of several of the
growth-relevant policies discussed in the previous subsection, such as social expenditures
(Potrafke (2009)), market-oriented reforms (Pitlik (2007)), the tax structure (Angelopou-
los et al. (2009)) or regulation of product markets (Potrafke (2010)); all of these aspects
were studied for OECD countries. It is usually found that left-wing parties redistribute
more and support government interventions in the economy whereas right-wing parties
are assumed to pursue more business friendly policies, support free markets and protect
legal rights. This might give rise to the expectation that right-wing parties should tend
to have an indirect positive effect on growth, which is induced by the specific policies that
they implement. This indirect effect might even be complemented by a direct one through
the impact of ideology on the expectations of market participants as discussed in section
2.2.
Yet, quite surprisingly, empirical evidence of a partisan effect on growth is very scarce
given the relevance of the issue and given the high number of studies of partisan effects on
fiscal policies. The notable exception is Bjørnskov (2005), who analyses decadal growth
rates for 58 countries since 1970. He employs the party ideology of the biggest party in
government as ideology measure. It is defined according to the party family approach,
taking a value of -1 for left-wing, 0 for center and +1 for right-wing parties. He finds that
countries with a longer period of right-wing governments showed better growth perfor-
mance. The averaging over 10 years, however, disperses the ideological differences between
the different political camps. Thus, the author stresses that this measure rather serves as
an indicator for the ideological orientation of the society in a given time period.
This lack of empirical evidence for an effect of the political environment on the economic
performance is striking given our considerations above, but may be explained by some
issues related to the ideology measures which are applied consistently in the economic
literature. First, parties differ in their positions regarding a multiplicity of policy areas.
A party belonging to the social-democratic party group is on average more leftist than
their rightist rival, but this does not have to be the case for all policy areas. It is easily
imaginable that economic right-wing (i.e. liberal) parties take left-wing positions in non-
economic issues and vice versa. And even more so, these party group differences might
obliterate more when it comes to party preferences with respect to specific, more narrowly
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defined and growth-relevant policy areas. Consequently, an aggregation to a simple left-
right scale might be too simplistic in our context, even though the party family approach
turns out to be suitable in detecting partisan effects in single policy areas as shown above.
Moreover, it is problematic for our panel analysis that ideological measures based on the
party family approach imply the equality of meaning of left-wing and right-wing in all
countries. This is, however, unrealistic, as evidence from expert surveys (e.g. Benoit and
Laver (2006)) or simple anecdotal evidence demonstrates (consider the positions of British
New Labour and French Socialists for example). Finally, in the party family approach
ideological positions are assumed to be stable over time, which can also be doubted based
on survey evidence (the British Labour party, for example, shifted fundamentally towards
the center under the leadership of Tony Blair).
Taking these concerns seriously, there are good reasons to explain why conventional ideol-
ogy measures fail to give strong results in growth regressions, even though they are highly
successful with respect to many other research questions. In particular, they do not allow
the identification of the growth-promoting policy areas. As there is a multitude of politi-
cal issues which can theoretically be assumed to affect growth, it is easily imaginable that
some of these influences have opposite directions and, consequently, cancel out each other
at the aggregate level. Therefore, in the following section we will present how measures
for party preferences are obtained at a more disaggregate level. That way it is possible
to differentiate between the influences of party stances in different policy areas on the
overall economic performance of a country.
3 Party Manifesto Data
3.1 Theoretical background
In this paper we use data obtained from the quantitative content analysis of party man-
ifestos. The application of this data is very common in political science, but not very
established in economics, so we present some introductory remarks in the following (see
e.g. Debus (2009) for a recent detailed overview on different approaches for the mea-
surement of party ideologies). The content analysis of party manifestos is based on the
saliency theory of party competition, which was pioneered by Budge et al. (1987). Ac-
cording to this approach, parties compete with each other over the emphasis of certain
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policy areas. Obvious examples are emphasis of environmental issues, which is typical
of green parties, or emphasis of welfare state issues, which is typical of left-wing parties.
These saliences of certain policy issues reflect the priorities of the parties and are then
communicated to the public in their electoral campaigns. According to saliency theory,
the degree of emphasis devoted to the issue is strongly related to the party’s position on
the issue.
Much research in political science has been devoted to the validation of manifesto data.
The plausibility and reliability have been compared with other indicators of political ide-
ology which are established in the political science literature (see Budge (2001) for an
overview). One important reference are expert surveys, which have been conducted on
various occasions among leading experts who located parties according to the left-right
dimension as well as their stances regarding specific policy dimensions. These surveys
(such as Benoit and Laver (2006)) provide very reliable data on ideological positions,
but unfortunately, there are only few waves available so this data merely has a cross-
sectional character and is not suitable for the panel approach conducted here. McDonald
and Mendes (2001) show that the general left-right dimension derived from the mani-
festo data is quite similar to expert surveys; consequently, they conclude that manifesto
data provides valid and reliable measurements of the ‘true’ party positions. Even more
so, they argue that manifesto data is superior to surveys concerning the measurement
of policy positions with regard to single policy dimensions, such as economic and social
policy, since experts are not as capable in distinguishing between these different areas.
Hence, manifesto data is perfectly suitable for our purpose of identifying time-variant
party preferences with regard to single, separable policy dimensions. Although it is true
that manifestos are strategically written texts, it has to be considered that they are official
documents, which means that party members cannot easily resile from the policies stated
in the manifestos once in power without being punished by the voters or the party base
(see Laver and Garry (2000)). Consequently, the ideological positions of the resulting
legislature can be assessed based on the party manifestos issued prior to the election.
For several dimensions the empirical literature has already confirmed that policy prefer-
ences of legislatures or governments which were derived from party manifestos are actually
correlated with various policy actions after the election. This issue has already been tack-
led by the very early contributions applying manifesto data. Budge and Hofferbert (1990)
and Hofferbert and Budge (1992) show for the United States and the United Kingdom,
9
respectively, that the emphasis of certain policy areas has a significant impact on related
expenditure categories. Bräuninger (2005) studies the relationship between spending pref-
erences and the public expenditure mix in a panel of OECD countries. He finds that the
indicator for expenditure preferences, calculated as the ratio of emphasis given to social
security issues to economic affairs categories, impacts on the expenditure mix as well as
the overall level of expenditures. Concerning welfare state policies, Amable et al. (2006)
show, based on a left-right measure derived from manifesto data, that more leftist gov-
ernments react differently to productivity shocks than rightist governments. They tend
to increase social expenditures, while right wing governments undertake stronger cuts of
the replacement rates. Finally, Geys and Nuscheler (2010) do not use an overall left-right
indicator but focus on the party preferences in policy fields related to health care. In
particular, they show that the emphasis given to the category “Welfare State Expansion”
(per504)8 is a significant determinant of public spending for health care.
An impact of manifesto-based measures for party preferences for single policy areas has
also been identified for some non-budgetary policy areas. Quinn and Toyoda (2007) show
that the emphasis given to the category “Free Enterprise” (per401) explains changes in in-
ternational capital account regulation. Duso and Röller (2003) and Duso and Seldeslachts
(2010) apply manifesto data in research related to industrial economics and find that the
emphasis given to the issues “Market Regulation” (per403) and “Welfare state limitation”
(per505) are determinants of the entry liberalization, and hence competition, in the digi-
tal mobile telephony. Finally, evidence also exists for environmental policies: Knill et al.
(2010) demonstrate that party preferences for “environmental protection” (per501) and
“anti-growth economy” (per416) positively affect the number of adopted environmental
policies.
3.2 Data Characteristics
We make use of the most prominent and comprehensive data source of party manifestos:
the dataset of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG), which has been known since 1989
as the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). It is an international large-scale project
in political science, which has collected the wording of 3,018 election manifestos from 54
countries since 1945. They are coded according to the frequency of (quasi-)sentences de-
8This is one of the 56 policy issues recorded in the CMP data set which will be presented in the
following subsection 3.2. The code refers to the category number as listed in Budge et al. (2001).
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voted to 56 categories comprising economic and non-economic issues. Examples for such
categories are “Law and Order”, “Welfare State expansion” or “Free Enterprise”. It is a
well-established approach in political science to calculate measures of party positions for
the general left-right dimension or single policy dimensions based on this data. We make
use of both kinds of measures and calculate the respective indices as the parliament’s ‘cen-
tre of gravity’, i.e. the position of the parties represented in parliament are weighted by
their relative seat share (Cusack (1997)). This allows for estimating the overall position
of a legislature for both the left-right dimension and policy area specific dimensions.9
The left-right dimension is already provided by the CMP dataset (see Budge et al. (2001)).
It is generated by adding up the share of sentences in the manifestos dedicated to cate-
gories which are consistently ascribed to right-wing parties, and subtracting those shares
devoted to categories which are typical for left-wing parties. Exemplarily, this indicator
is depicted in figure 1 for the major parties in the UK, Labour Party and Conservative
Party. A higher value indicates more right-wing positions taken by the party. As can be
seen, the positions of both parties fluctuate over time, but the Conservatives are always
“more rightist” than Labour. Interestingly, this data reflects the shift of the position of
Labour Party to the centre under Tony Blair at the election of 1997 very well.
Figure 1: Positions of parties in the UK, left-right scale
9Note that this approach is tailored for parliamentary systems with proportional representation, which
constitute the majority in our sample. In subsection 4.4 we test the robustness of our results by considering
that under plurality representation opposition parties tend to be marginalized.
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The calculation of measures for policy area specific dimensions is performed similarly
by subtracting the share of negative from the share of positive statements towards the
respective issue. Principally, it is also possible to use the saliencies of the single cate-
gories provided by the CMP data as explanatory variables; however, this is problematic
for small categories. As discussed by Budge (2001), such categories are particularly prone
to random errors and statistical noise in the codings. Moreover, several of the categories
have very similar meanings (such as “Controlled Economy” and “Nationalisation”), or the
categories refer to opposed statements towards the same issue (e.g. “Controlled Econ-
omy” and “Free Enterprise”). Consequently, we develop measures for policy area specific
dimensions by adding up the shares of statements of similar and subtracting those of
contrary categories concerning specific policy areas. In particular, we develop 8 indices,
which cover 7 different policy areas (the exact assignment of the categories which are
recorded in the CMP data set to our indices will be presented together with the results
in the following section):
• Interventions : positive references to interventions in the markets (e.g. regulation,
controlled economy), negative references to free markets
• Incentives for Business : favourable mentions of incentives for the private sector of
the economy (e.g. moderate wage and tax policies, encouragement to start enter-
prise)
• Technology and Infrastructure: importance of science and modernisation of methods
of transport and communication
• Institutions : emphasis of improving the quality of institutions (e.g. fight corruption,
support democracy)
• Economic Orthodoxy : need for non-Keynesian policies (e.g. reduction of budget
deficits)
• Decentralization: support for federalism or devolution
• Welfare State (narrow): support for welfare state expansion and social justice
• Welfare State (broad): broader definition of pro-welfare state policies, additionally
comprising positive references to labour groups, unemployed and non-economic de-
mographic groups
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For instance, the more frequently parties formulate statements in their manifestos that
belong to intervention-related issues, the more they can be assumed to be in favour of
pro-interventionist legislative proposals. The descriptive statistics for these seven policy
dimensions are given in Table 9 in the appendix. The largest standard deviations can
be found for Institutions and the Welfare State indices. In Table 10, the correlations of
the indices are presented. It can be seen that the two welfare state measures are highly
correlated due to their construction, but the other correlations are relatively modest.
4 Empirical model and results
Two different approaches exist in the related empirical growth literature. First, it is a
well-established strategy to add the variable of interest, in our case the political variables
described above, to a panel growth regression which comprises a number of further control
variables. This is the typical approach of the political economic analyses cited above,
such as concerning the growth effect of economic freedom indices (e.g, Berggren and
Jordahl (2005)) or political ideology (Bjørnskov (2005)). Analogous to these studies, we
will test our political variables in standard growth regressions. The macroeconometric
literature, however, stresses that this approach might be problematic since there is no
consensus how to specify the model correctly. Even though the theoretical literature
predicts the relevance of certain determinants, these are often difficult to quantify. Hence,
the researcher faces a high number of potential factors of influence which are, moreover,
very often highly correlated. For reason of this model uncertainty, a second class of
empirical approaches is often employed, which is known as model averaging approaches.
Such an approach will be employed in subsection 4.2, where the robustness of the previous
results will be examined.
4.1 Fixed effects model
We start with the examination of our political variables in a country panel, consisting
of 23 OECD countries and covering the period 1971-2004. The empirical model which
will be employed throughout this section is based on the standard growth literature and
includes country fixed effects. This is due to the panel structure of the data. While much
of the growth literature employs cross-section data and focusses on differences between
countries, we are interested in the effects due to variations in the ideological positions of
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the national legislatures. Consequently, the application of fixed effects allows us to iso-
late time-invariant country-specific differences, such as geographical location or cultural
factors.
Our approach differs from many related papers by applying yearly data whereas most of
the literature averages the variables over 5 years (and some even over a longer period).
The application of yearly data is possible due to the good data availability for industrial-
ized countries. There are further good reasons to apply yearly data in our context. As the
composition of the legislature regularly shifts abruptly after elections, averaging of several
years leads to a severe loss of information. This is not very problematic with other vari-
ables studied in related research, such as public expenditures, as these are quite invariable
in the short term, or economic freedom indices, which are not available annually. Our
variables of interest, however, fluctuate significantly over the years, so averaging would
purge out much of its informative content. Nevertheless, it is regularly argued in favor
of averaging in growth regressions because with the application of yearly data, business
cycle movements may bias the results (see Islam (2003)).10 We address this concern by
adding time fixed effects which capture international comovements of the business cycles.
Moreover, we examine the robustness of our results by reestimating our model with 5-year
averages in section 4.3.
The testable model is of the following form:
∆yt,i = β0 + β1Polt−1,i + β2yt−1,i + Zβ3 + i + ηt + ui,t (1)
This model includes country fixed effects (i) and time fixed effects (ηt). The depen-
dent variable is the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, which is obtained from the
Penn World Tables data set. Polt−1,i represents the political variables which will be tested,
i.e. the general left-right dimension as well as the indices for party preferences concerning
policy area specific dimensions. As described above, these variables are determined from
the CMP data as the centre of gravity of the respective legislature. The lagged level of
per capita GDP ( yt−1,i) is added in order to control for catch-up processes. Moreover, Z
represents the vector of further control variables. Due to the multitude of available vari-
ables, we present estimations for two different sets of control variables. First, we present
a small model only containing basic controls for the convergence process (lagged GDP
10Yet, as Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) argue, five-year averages are not free from cyclical influences
either since there is a lack of synchronization in country business cycles.
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per capita), human capital (share of population in the working age) and fixed capital
(investment share). Moreover, we introduce variables accounting for further possible po-
litical economic influences on growth. First, a variable indicating election years11 captures
the theorized effect of political business cycles, i.e. the tendency of the incumbents to
generate a boom prior to an election in order to increase their reelection probability (see
Nordhaus (1975)). Second, the number of parties represented in a government is related
to the “weak government hypothesis”, indicating that more fragmented governments have
lower assertiveness (see Roubini and Sachs (1989)). The extended set of control variables
(see table 11 in the appendix for an overview of all control variables applied in the paper)
introduces a number of further controls which are related to theoretical growth models
and find application in related empirical works. Since we detect heteroscedasticity as well
as autocorrelation of the residuals (as indicated by the Wooldridge test) in all regressions,
we present t-statistics based on robust standard errors. They are clustered by country
and robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
The first aspect we study is the broadest measure of ideology: the general left-right di-
mension. In table 1, the indicator based on manifesto data and provided in the CMP data
set is contrasted with a measure which is based on the party family approach. The latter
is based on the classification of the database of political institutions (DPI, see Beck et al.
(2001)) and has a value of -1 if the government is completely held by left-wing parties
and +1 if it is completely held by right-wing parties (coalition governments are weighted
according to the parliament seats of parties). The results depicted in the table indicate
that the choice of the indicator for ideology has a major impact on the results. The appli-
cation of the DPI data does not detect a significant impact on growth rates, while the data
obtained from party manifestos (CMP) suggests that legislatures dominated by parties
with a more right-wing programmatic profile positively affect the economic performance.
The economic control variables perform reasonably well in these as well as in the following
specifications although many of them are statistically insignificant, which should not be
surprising due to the multicollinearity of several of the controls. In particular, the lagged
GDP per capita has the expected negative signs reflecting convergence and is significant
in most cases. The lagged size of government also turns out to have a negative impact,
which is, however, not always significant. The election variable is insignificant in all cases,
11In particular, the variable takes the value of the share of months prior to the election in the election
year.
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Table 1: Regression Results: yearly data, fixed effects
Variable DPI CMP
Ideologyt−1 -0.135 -0.089 0.016* 0.020**
(-0.124) (0.137) (0.009) (0.008)
GDP per capitat−1 -0.104 -0.142* -0.110 -0.145*
(0.090) (0.075) (0.093) (0.076)
Population share 15-64t 0.234 0.107 0.252 0.107
(0.155) (0.129) (0.154) (0.117)
Investment sharet−1 0.011 0.004 0.013 0.007
(0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.041)
Election 0.227 0.183 0.23 0.183
(0.280) (0.254) (0.282) (0.257)
Number partiest−1 -0.14 -0.157 -0.156 -0.159
(0.098) (0.106) (0.097) (0.096)
Investment pricet−1 -0.013 -0.013
(0.013) (0.012)
Population growtht 0.584 0.583
(0.349) (0.353)
Public expendituret−1 -0.144 -0.157
(0.112) (0.104)






Fertility ratet -0.910* -1.074*
(0.516) (0.582)




Constant -9.729 12.305 -10.6 10.611
(9.734) (9.717) (9.616) (8.449)
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 766 753 766 753
R-squared 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.35
Robust standard errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
which militates against the presence of pronounced political business cycle effects in our
sample.
We then proceed with the disaggregated analysis of policy preferences. Each of the
seven measures we constructed from the CMP data is tested in the two empirical models
presented above. Moreover, all of the components of the indices are tested individually.
The foloowing categories differ largely in their quantitative relevance (as indicated by their
means): Welfare State Expansion is the largest category (about 7% of all sentences in the
manifestos are devoted to this category), while smaller categories such as Nationalisation
are only rarely mentioned (less than 1%). The exact assignment of the categories recorded
in the CMP data to our measures for the policy dimensions can be seen in Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary regression results: disaggregated policy areas
Small Model Large Model
Mean Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev.
Interventions -0.068** 0.031 -0.075** 0.032
− Free Enterprise (401) 2.12 0.039 0.039 0.062 0.040
+ Market Regulation (403) 1.88 -0.093 0.056 -0.143*** 0.045
+ Economic Planning (404) 1.06 -0.068 0.115 -0.099 0.108
+ Protectionism (406-407) 0.04 0.022 0.106 0.179* 0.089
+ Controlled Economy (412) 0.86 -0.163** 0.075 -0.140* 0.073
+ Nationalisation (413) 0.32 0.354 0.227 0.342* 0.169
Technology and Infrastructure (411) 5.23 0.113** 0.050 0.125** 0.045
Economic Orthodoxy -0.007 0.034 -0.009 0.029
+ Economic Orthodoxy (414) 2.94 -0.005 0.033 -0.007 0.028
− Keynesian Demand Management (409) 0.32 -0.074 0.121 0.023 0.110
Incentives for Business 0.110*** 0.029 0.125*** 0.036
+ Incentives (402) 3.01 0.130** 0.050 0.150*** 0.050
+ Productivity (410) 2.38 0.115* 0.063 0.117* 0.064
Institutions 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.016
+ Freedom and Human Rights (201) 2.31 0.043 0.044 0.019 0.043
+ Democracy (202) 3.21 0.071 0.052 0.053 0.058
+ Constitutionalism (203-204) 0.023 0.071 -0.012 0.059
+ Governmental and Adminsitrative Efficiency (303) 3.78 -0.097*** 0.031 -0.069** 0.032
+ Political Corruption (304) 0.86 0.045 0.047 0.011 0.04
+ Political Authority (305) 3.72 0.015 0.026 0.011 0.021
+ Law and Order (605) 2.68 -0.016 0.046 -0.041 0.041
Decentralisation (301-302) 2.08 -0.069 0.069 -0.071 0.046
Welfare State (narrow) -0.032 0.021 -0.057*** 0.020
+ Social Justice (503) 4.56 -0.034 0.051 -0.084* 0.048
+ Welfare State Expansion (504) 7.23 -0.032 0.026 -0.039 0.026
− Welfare State Limitation (505) 0.5 -0.043 0.138 -0.102 0.119
Welfare State (broad) -0.056*** 0.018 -0.064*** 0.019
+ Social Harmony (606) 1.72 -0.082 0.067 -0.076 0.065
+ Labour Groups (701-702) 2.24 -0.070 0.042 -0.083 0.058
+ Non-economic Demographic Groups (706) 4.26 -0.058 0.039 -0.037 0.037
Robust standard errors which allow for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
Categories which are marked with a ‘+’ are incorporated positively in the calculation of
the respective index; those marked with a ‘−’ denote categories with the opposite meaning
of the index and are incorporated negatively in the calculation.
The regression results are summarised subsequently in the same table.12 It can be
seen that several of the indices show a statistically significant effect on growth. First,
Interventions has a negative impact, which is mainly driven by positive references to
a direct government control of the economy. Similarly, a negative impact can also be
detected at least for the broad indicator of Welfare State policies, whereas the results
for the narrow index are also negative but not statistically robust. A positive impact
is found for two indices. Technology and Infrastructure and in particular Incentives for
Business exhibit a positive impact and turn out to have a positive effect at very high
levels of statistical significance. The quantitative effects of the political variables are not
12The complete regression results will be provided upon request to the author.
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Table 3: Regression results: yearly data, fixed effects
Variable Small Model Large Model
Interventions -0.091** -0.087*** -0.091*** -0.088***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
Technology and Infrastructure 0.126** 0.121** 0.120** 0.117**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (0.045)
Economic Orthodoxy -0.025 -0.029 -0.020 -0.025
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Incentives for Business 0.099*** 0.086** 0.108** 0.093**
(0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043)
Institutions 0.028 0.023 0.012 0.009
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
Decentralisation -0.068 -0.066 -0.091* -0.083
(0.075) (0.074) (0.052) (0.050)
Welfare State (narrow) -0.014 -0.037**
(0.015) (0.017)
Welfare State (broad) -0.026 -0.034*
(0.016) (0.018)
GDP per capitat−1 -0.123 -0.129 -0.182** -0.190**
(0.087) (0.085) (0.074) (0.072)
Population share 15-64t 0.255* 0.252* 0.147 0.127
(0.143) (0.137) (0.109) (0.104)
Investment sharet−1 0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.000
(0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038)
Election 0.280 0.275 0.219 0.219
(0.282) (0.283) (0.266) (0.265)
Number partiest−1 -0.206 -0.204 -0.207* -0.209*
(0.121) (0.120) (0.110) (0.110)
Investment pricet−1 -0.016 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012)
Population growtht 0.598* 0.596*
(0.345) (0.338)
Public expendituret−1 -0.176* -0.171*
(0.087) (0.089)






Fertility ratet -1.026** -1.041**
(0.448) (0.466)




Constant -11.426 -10.492 12.047 15.049*
(9.028) (8.599) (8.793) (8.389)
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 766 766 753 753
R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.39
Robust standard errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
negligible: for all of these variables, a one-standard-deviation causes an absolute change
of the subsequent annual growth rate by about 0.4%. No robust results are found for the
other measures, i.e. Decentralization, Institutions and Economic Orthodoxy.
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Finally, in Table 3, the 7 measures derived from the manifesto data are jointly tested in our
two growth models. The results largely confirm the findings from the individual analyses.
Again, Incentives for Business and Technology and Infrastructure are consistently found
to have a positive impact on growth rates and the negative impact of Interventions turns
out to be robust as well. In contrast to this, the measures for Welfare State preferences
do not yield significant results in every case.
4.2 Model Averaging
Approaches which are not restricted to the testing of few regressors but attach a multi-
plicity of explanatory variables enjoy increasing popularity in empirical macroeconomic
research. They become necessary due to the “open-endedness” of growth theories, which
denotes that the validity of one causal theory does not imply that other theories are false
(see Brock and Durlauf (2001) for example). Consequently, the huge number of possible
growth determinants and the even bigger number of available explanatory variables allows
the estimation of millions of possible combinations of regressors. Durlauf et al. (2005)
find in their survey a total number of more than 140 growth determinants which are
considered in the empirical literature. This problem has motivated the development of
several approaches which allow for checking the robustness of regressors given this model
uncertainty. Most notably, the model averaging approaches by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004)
and Durlauf et al. (2008) incorporate a huge number of potential growth determinants in
order to study the relevance of competing theoretical models.
Due to the prominence of these techniques in the related macroeconomic growth liter-
ature, a model averaging approach is applied in the following in order to demonstrate
the robustness of the findings from the previous estimations. In an approach similar to
ours, Bergh and Karlsson (2010) validate the robustness of their explanatory variables
– components of the economic freedom index and globalization – in a BACE (Bayesian
averaging of classical estimates) approach borrowed from Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
In the following, a rather new model averaging technique introduced by Magnus et al.
(2010) is applied, which is known as weighted average least squares (WALS). This method
is similar to classical Bayesian model averaging techniques, but has some theoretical and
computational advantages as demonstrated in their article. Moreover, the code provided
by the authors13 is the first to allow the definition of a subset of explanatory variables
13The MATLAB code can be downloaded at http://center.uvt.nl/staff/magnus/wals/.
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as ‘focus’ regressors which always stay in the model. Thus, we can insert time-fixed
and country-fixed effects, which is a minor innovation for the model averaging literature
usually applying cross-section data.
Table 4: Regression results: WALS approach
Variable Coefficient Standard Deviation t-ratios
Inflationt−1 -0.059 0.017 -3.482
Globalizationt -0.086 0.025 -3.378
GDP per capitat−1 -0.144 0.044 -3.264
Technology and Infrastructure 0.092 0.033 2.788
Interventions -0.079 0.031 -2.565
Incentives for Business 0.073 0.029 2.552
Public expendituret−1 -0.164 0.064 -2.547
Population growtht 0.403 0.232 1.734
Investment pricet−1 -0.012 0.007 -1.608
Number Parties -0.138 0.097 -1.414
Fertility ratet -0.691 0.508 -1.361
Decentralisation -0.064 0.049 -1.324
Population share 15-64t 0.114 0.092 1.241
EUt 0.322 0.354 0.909
Welfare State (narrow) -0.022 0.028 -0.786
Economic Orthodoxy -0.021 0.031 -0.681
Welfare State (broad) -0.016 0.024 -0.657
Electiont 0.137 0.213 0.643
Institutions 0.005 0.014 0.346
Schoolingt 0.002 0.008 0.32
Urbant -0.008 0.043 -0.177
Investmentt−1 -0.003 0.018 -0.158
The estimation results are given in Table 4. The variables representing the policy
preferences have the same signs as in the previous regressions. We compute t-ratios in
order to compare the relative importance of the regressors, which are arranged according to
the absolute values of the t-ratios. Three of the political variables show a high robustness:
Incentives for Business, Technology and Infrastructure and Interventions. These are the
very same variables found to be robustly correlated with economic performance in the
approaches presented above. Only three further control variables are found to be as
important, with inflation in first place. The other indices derived from party preferences,
including both welfare state policies indicators, are found to be of minor importance.
4.3 Controlling for short-term variability
Although there are good arguments to stick to annual regressions due to the characteristics
of our data, we check the robustness of our results by averaging all variables over 5-year
periods. The following specifications comprise a panel with the same variables which
were used before. They are all averaged over 5 years, with lagged GDP per capita being
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the only exception. The last enters the regressions with its value in the initial year of
the respective 5 year period. This approach makes our results highly comparable to the
existing literature and ensures that our previous results are not biased due to the existence
of short-term business cycle effects.





Technology and Infrastructure 0.112** 0.089
(0.052) (0.052)
Incentives for Business 0.155*** 0.132**
(0.038) (0.053)








GDP per capitat−1 -0.168* -0.156* -0.136 -0.159* -0.172** -0.173**
(0.085) (0.081) (0.079) (0.077) (0.082) (0.069)
Population share 15-64t 0.039 0.034 0.252* 0.056 0.032 0.064
(0.127) (0.122) (0.143) (0.123) (0.122) (0.103)
Investment sharet−1 0.075 0.088 0.063 0.071 0.080 0.059
(0.069) (0.062) (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.057)
Number partiest−1 -0.205 -0.214 -0.208 -0.153 -0.145 -0.180
(0.182 (0.176) (0.168) (0.148) (0.175) 0.194
Investment pricet−1 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Population growtht 0.621 0.643 0.507 0.526 0.532 0.662
(0.604) (0.607) (0.618) (0.590) (0.630) (0.522)
Public expendituret−1 -0.246** -0.230** -0.248** -0.277** -0.257** -0.278**
(0.107) (0.100) (0.107) (0.109) (0.104) (0.105)
Enrollment secondaryt 0.021* 0.024* 0.009 0.018 0.023* 0.018
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Globalizationt -0.055 -0.057 -0.055 -0.072 -0.044 -0.084
(0.058) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.053) (0.051)
Inflationt−1 -0.090** -0.078** -0.082** -0.095** -0.081** -0.092**
(0.039) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038) (0.034) 0.034
Fertility ratet -1.030 -1.090 -0.532 -0.595 -0.876 -1.053
(0.798) (0.708) (0.740) (0.646) (0.739) (0.697)
Urban 0.094 0.071 0.082 0.018* 0.091* 0.108
(0.058) (0.052) (0.057) (0.066) (0.049) (0.064)
Constant 1.738 1.703 2.746 -1.626 2.817 1.906
(0.058) (8.097) (9.347) (8.252) (8.131) (7.869)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135
R-squared 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.60
Robust standard errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
The sample now covers the period 1970-2000 and contains the full set of control vari-
ables. The results, which are presented in Table 5, show few qualitative changes compared
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to the previous results. In particular, the overall left-right indicator is still significant.
The measures for the policy preferences also respond quite robustly to the modification
of the specification. The variables previously found to be relevant for economic perfor-
mance – Interventions, Technology and Infrastructure and Incentives for Business – have
the identical signs as in the regressions using yearly data and are statistically significant
when tested individually.
4.4 Correcting for plurality systems
Until now, we applied our political measures capturing the relative party strengths in the
legislature consistently. These measures, however, might be inadequate for Westminster-
style parliaments, in which strong one-party governments dominate the political agenda.
For that reason, in the regressions depicted in Table 6 we consider the government centre
of gravity instead of the parliament centre of gravity for those countries which are classified
as plurality systems.14
The results are qualitatively in line with those obtained with the original political
measures in section 4.1. The main difference can be observed for the coefficient of the
general left-right dimensions which declines and becomes insignificant. The indices for
preferences with respect to disaggregated policy areas turn out to be more robust when
the government positions are considered for plurality systems and show quantitatively
similar results as before.
4.5 Potential endogeneity
Finally, we address the potential endogeneity of our political variables. Obviously, the
composition of the legislature is not exogenously assigned, since it is the result of elections.
These election outcomes might be affected by the national economic situation, so this issue
has to be taken serious. The following causal chain might then bias the previous results:
the citizens of a country in recession might be more inclined to vote for more economic
liberal parties (see Stevenson (2001) for evidence in this direction). Since yearly growth
rates can be assumed to be autocorrelated positively to a certain degree, this would
imply that the incumbency of these parties is correlated with rather low growth rates
immediately after the election.
14We applied the classification introduced by the DPI.
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Technology and Infrastructure 0.103*** 0.091**
(0.034) (0.033)
Incentives for Business 0.091*** 0.059**
(0.026) (0.028)








GDP per capitat−1 -0.143* -0.145* -0.152** -0.160** -0.152** -0.179**
(0.075) (0.076) (0.069) (0.076) (0.072) (0.071)
Population share 15-64t 0.092 0.109 0.091 0.104 0.092 0.094
(0.126) (0.122) (0.129) (0.117) (0.116) (0.115)
Investment sharet−1 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.003
(0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038)
Election 0.181 0.174 0.233 0.182 0.212
(0.254) (0.253) (0.262) (0.253) (0.256) (0.264)
Number partiest−1 -0.173* -0.185* -0.183* -0.157 -0.180* -0.231**
(0.099) (0.102) (0.102) (0.096) (0.097) (0.102)
Investment pricet−1 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 -0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Population growtht 0.575 0.615* 0.578 0.619* 0.552 0.615*
(0.358) (0.352) (0.358) (0.339) (0.331) (0.345)
Public expendituret−1 -0.153 -0.142 -0.149 -0.170 -0.160 -0.163*
(0.105) (0.104) (0.098) (0.106) (0.104) (0.095)
Enrollment secondaryt 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Globalizationt -0.091 -0.094* -0.109* -0.106* -0.086 -0.115**
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052 ) (0.049)
Inflationt−1 -0.070 -0.067 -0.069 -0.074* -0.067 -0.070*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.038)
Fertility ratet -1.012* -1.095* -0.769 -0.868 -1.036* -1.138**
(0.524) (0.528) (0.505) (0.537) (0.538) (0.480)
Urban -0.008 0.017 -0.030 -0.001 -0.014 -0.030
(0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045)
Constant 12.837 12.608 15.990 12.886 14.320 18.812
(9.055) (9.077) (10.081) (8.811) (8.645) (8.759)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 753 753 753 753 753 753
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.38
Robust standard errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
We want to investigate this more closely and regress the changes of the ideology
variables on the GDP growth rates of the respective year and the preceding year, plus the
full set of control variables used before (since no other variable is statistically significant
in more than one regression, their results are omitted in the summary table). The results
are summarised in Table 7. As can be seen, all variables have the sign which would
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Table 7: Summary of regression results: explanation of ideology changes
Explanatory variables
Dependent variable GDP growtht GDP growtht−1
∆ Left-right (CMP)t−1 -0.110 -0.122
(0.086) (0.113)
∆ Interventionst−1 -0.060 -0.002
(0.037) (0.028)
∆ Technology and Infrastructuret−1 -0.061** -0.038
(0.028) (0.043)
∆ Incentives for Businesst−1 -0.010 -0.050
(0.051) (0.041)
∆ Economic Orthodoxyt−1 -0.029 0.002
(0.021) (0.029)
∆ Institutionst−1 0.010 -0.025
(0.072) (0.076)
∆ Decentralisationt−1 0.005 -0.008
(0.018) (0.017)
∆ Welfare State (narrow)t−1 0.114** 0.020
(0.064) (0.043)
∆ Welfare State (broad)t−1 0.193** 0.083
(0.074) (0.058)
Observations: 753 in all regressions. The estimations contain country fixed effects and period dummies. The full set of control variables
applied in table 3. Robust standard errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses: * Significant at the 10%
level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
be predicted by our assumption, i.e. in years of low growth rates the positions of the
legislatures tended to shift to more right-wing (or market liberal) positions. This might be
induced by higher vote shares for right-wing parties or platform shifts of the parties to the
right. Yet, this effect is moderate in most cases, since all coefficients except the Technology
and Infrastructure and the Welfare State variables are not statistically significant .
Although the endogeneity problem does not seem to be very substantive from a quan-
titative perspective, we want to address the issue in the best possible way. Unfortunately,
there are no reasonable instruments available for our political variables. Instead, we check
the robustness of our previous results by omitting the observations in the years subse-
quent to elections. At this point of time, the mechanism sketched above should have
the strongest impact, so this will be corrected by our procedure. We expect that in our
previous estimates the coefficients are biased downward since in recession years the legis-
latures tend to shift to more market liberal positions as we have just demonstrated. Thus,
these more market liberal positions would be linked with the still lower growth rate in
the subsequent year.
In Table 8, the regressions for the main variables are rerun after excluding those obser-
vations for years subsequent to election years. The results are qualitatively in line with
those presented above and the quantitative differences are modest as well. The t-values
of our variables of interest, however, are slightly higher than before in most cases, which
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Technology and Infrastructure 0.134** 0.122**
(0.048) (0.047)
Incentives for Business 0.144*** 0.108***
(0.035) (0.035)








GDP per capitat−1 -0.170* -0.170* -0.182* -0.195** -0.191** -0.217**
(0.082) (0.085) (0.078) (0.083) (0.080) (0.079)
Population share 15-64t 0.205 0.208 0.187 0.191 0.184 0.158
(0.147) (0.149) (0.161) (0.141) (0.137) (0.144)
Investment sharet−1 -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 -0.021 -0.011 -0.021
(0.027) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
Number partiest−1 -0.010 -0.032 -0.029 0.011 -0.026 -0.097
(0.098) (0.102) (0.110) (0.094) (0.096) (0.115)
Investment pricet−1 -0.019 -0.021 -0.024 -0.016 -0.020 -0.022
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Population growtht 0.783** 0.833** 0.734* 0.805** 0.740* 0.815
(0.377) (0.370) (0.380) (0.374) (0.363) (0.370)
Public expendituret−1 -0.211 -0.205 -0.206 -0.234 -0.228 -0.221
(0.162) (0.161) (0.155) (0.162) (0.159) (0.141)
Enrollment secondaryt 0.002 0.003 -0.008 -0.000 0.005 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Globalizationt -0.130** -0.131** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.129** -0.152***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.049) (0.042)
Inflationt−1 -0.126*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.128*** -0.120*** -0.126***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029)
Fertility ratet -1.117** -1.183** -0.726 -0.809 -1.001* -1.381**
(0.536) (0.504) (0.505) (0.546) (0.509) (0.554)
Urban 0.015 0.000 -0.025 0.016 -0.002 0.001
(0.055) (0.053) (0.049) (0.051) (0.052) (0.049)
Constant 6.980 8.269 11.735 8.475 10.697 14.325
(11.397) (11.829) (12.566) (10.893) (10.648) (11.367)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 535 535 535 535 535 535
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.45
Robust standard errors allowing for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant
at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
confirms our expectation that the earlier estimations were marginally biased downward.
Consequently, we can conclude that the endogeneity problem does not seem quantitatively
important and that it even leads to an underestimation of the measured effects; so the
coefficients presented above have to be regarded as lower boundaries of the true effects.
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5 Discussion
Our results imply that the political environment matters for the performance of the econ-
omy in democratic societies. Although this conclusion should not be very surprising to
policy advisers or political observers, the empirical literature has always found it diffi-
cult to confirm this claim. The possible channels of a political influence on the economic
performance are diverse and complex, so our consideration of policy preferences based on
manifesto data offers a new approach to quantify the political environment.
In particular, the most usual simplification of ideology, which is a simple left-right classifi-
cation of the government according to party labels, is shown to be uncapable of explaining
differences in the economic performance of OECD countries. In this regard, our measures
derived from party manifesto data offer the opportunity to assess the preferences of po-
litical parties in a more detailed way. They are not based on the simple characterization
of parties as left-wing or right-wing, but on their actual programmatic profile, which rep-
resents their political preferences. Considering these party preferences. We are thus able
to identify an impact of party preferences for certain policy issues.
Our approach can be regarded as a complement to several related findings that study an
effect of politics on growth based on measurable political actions, such as expenditures.
Both approaches have their specific drawbacks: our measures of political preferences are
obviously not a perfect correlate with policies which are actually implemented. On the
other side, the related literature which is mainly based on narrow expenditure measures
is not capable of incorporating political decisions which do not involve the public budget
or only impact on the expectations of the market participants. Interestingly, the results
of both approaches are along the same lines when it comes to the impact of disaggregated
policy areas.
Nonetheless, our results pose some new questions. The detected effects mainly suggest a
positive impact of an investment-friendly political environment and are well in line with
the predictions from growth theory. Yet, their size and speed are astonishing. Growth
theory predicts such growth-enhancing (or growth-depressing) consequences of public in-
terventions to materialize rather in the medium and long term and not as fast as our results
indicate. Moreover, concerns related to the practical conduct of public policy, such as de-
cision and implementation lags, also militate against the presumption that the identified
effects are mainly the result of real interventions of politics, such as public expenditure or
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non-budgetary regulations. Consequently, there is a high probability that many of these
effects are actually transmitted via the expectations of the market participants, which
are shaped by the political environment. This issue, however, is highly unexplored in the
economic literature, so we are only able to speculate about its relevance.
Furthermore, it is important to stress that our findings should not give rise to misun-
derstandings concerning the political implications. First, although we found that party
preferences for certain policy areas turn out to have a significant impact on economic
performance, we could not detect an impact of party ideology based on the party family
approach. Hence, growth-stimulating economic policy does not depend on the question
whether a left-wing or right-wing party is in office. It rather depends on the actual pro-
grammatic profile of the party, although it cannot be denied that the identified growth-
enhancing policies can be broadly categorized as economic liberal policies. Second, we
analysed the effect on short-term economic performance and not on long-term economic
growth, which would require a completely different research design. Thus, positive effects
of certain policies only accruing in the long-term perspective, which for instance can be
expected of investments in education, cannot be captured by our analysis.
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6 Appendix
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of policy preferences measures
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Right-left dimension -2.62 12.41 -31.42 39.71
Interventions 2.05 3.73 -7.57 15.97
Technology and Infrastructure 5.23 3.29 0.07 19.79
Economic Orthodoxy 2.62 2.83 -2.07 18.27
Incentives for Business 5.39 3.47 0 26.09
Institutions 17.02 8.01 3.09 46.64
Decentralisation 2.08 1.90 -3.82 12.94
Welfare State (narrow) 11.29 5.15 0.89 31.79
Welfare State (broad) 19.51 6.39 1.21 51.21
Table 10: Correlations of policy preferences measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Interventions 1
(2) Technology and Infrastructure -0.03 1
(3) Economic Orthodoxy -0.23 -0.08 1
(4) Incentives for Business -0.02 0.17 0.07 1
(5) Institutions -0.07 -0.13 -0.02 -0.25 1
(6) Decentralisation 0.06 -0.08 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 1
(7) Welfare State (narrow) 0.22 -0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.2 -0.08 1
(8) Welfare State (broad) 0.20 -0.12 -0.07 -0.16 -0.29 -0.08 0.75 1
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics, control variables





Growth rate of real GDP per
capita, in %




Level of real GDP per capita (chain
index) divided by 1,000
17.96 6.25 4.51 4.93 Penn World Table
Version 6.2
DPI Position of government (-1: left-
wing)





Population aged 15-64, share of to-
tal population in %




Share of investments in GDP in % 23.76 5.78 -4.37 72.82 World Development
Indicators
Election Share of months prior to the elec-
tion in the election year
0.17 0.31 0 1 own calculations




Number of parties in government
coalition, end of year




Price Level of Investment in PPP
(USA=100)








Government share of real GDP in
%
16.33 4.23 4.58 27.98 Penn World Table
Version 6.2
Schooling Gross enrollment rate in secondary
education
96.31 18.71 37.18 161.66 World Bank Edstat
Database
Globalization KOF globalization index, cor-
rected for flow variables
0.14 0.34 0 1 Dreher (2006), 2008
version
Inflation Annual change of consumer price
index, in %




Births per woman 1.97 0.58 1.15 4.11 World Development
Indicators
Urban Share of urban population, in % 72.58 12.39 39.26 97.16 World Development
Indicators
EU member Dummy variable for EU member-
ship
0.46 0.50 0 1 own calculations
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